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The E. H. Lindley Memorial Lectureship Fund was established in 
1941 in memory of Ernest H. Lindley, Chancellor of the University of 
Kansas from 1920 to 1939. In February 1941 Mr. Roy Roberts, the 
chairman of the committee in chnrge, suggested in the Graduate Mag-
az.i ne that 
the Chancellor should invite to the University for a lectu re or a se-
ries oflectures, some outstanding national or world figure to speak 
on "Values of Living" -just as the late Chancellor proposed to do 
in his courses "The Human Situation" and "Plan for Living." 
In the following june Mr. Roberts circulated a letter on behalf of the 
Committee, proposing in somewhat broader terms that 
The income from this fund should be spent in a quest of social bet-
terment by bringing to the University each year outstanding world 
leaders for a lecture or series of lectures, yet with a design so broad 
in its outline that in the years to come, ifit is deemed wise, this liv-
ing memorial could take some more desirable form. 
The fund was allowed to accumulate until 1954, when Professor 
Richard McKeon lectured on "Human Rights and International Re-
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Equality or Priority?1 
Derek Parfit 
In his article 'Equality', Nagel imagines that he has two children, 
one healthy and happy, the other suffering from a painful handicap. 
He could either move to a city where the second child could receive 
special treatment, or move to a suburb where the first child would flour-
ish. Nagel \\Tites: 
This is a difficult choice on any view. To make it a test for the 
value of equality, I \V"cUlt to suppose that the case has the following 
feature: the gain to the first child of moving to the suburb is 
substantially greater than the gain to the second child of mov-
ing to the city. 
He then comments: 
If one chose to move to the city, it would be an egalitarian de-
cision. It is more urgent to benefit the second child, even 
though the benefit we can give him is less than the benefit we 
can give to the first child. This urgency is not necessarily deci-
sive. It may be outweighed by other considerations, for equal-
ity is not the only value. But it is a factor, and it depends on the 
worse off position of the second child.2 
My aim, in this lecture, is to discuss this kind of egalitarian reasoning. 
Nagel's decision turns on the relative importance of two facts: he 
could give one child a greater benefit, but the other child is worse ofT. 
There are countless cases of this kind. In these cases, when we are 
choosing between two acts or policies, one relevant fact is how great 
the resulting benefits would be. For Utilitarians, that is all that mat-
ters. On their view, we should always aim for the greatest sum of ben-
efits. But, for Egalitarians, it also matters how well off the beneficiaries 
would be. We should sometimes choose a smaller sum of benefits, for 
the sake of a better distribution. 
How can we make a distribution better? Some say: by aiming for 
equality between different people. Others say: by giving priority to those 
who arc worse off. As we shall sec, these are different ideas. 
Should we accept these ideas? Docs equality matter? If so, when and 
why? What kind of priority, if any, should we give to those who arc worse 
off? 
These arc difficult questions, but their subject matter is, in a way, 
simple. It is enough to consider different possible states of affairs, or 
outcomes, each involving the same set of people. We imagine that we 
know how well off, in these outcomes, these people would be. We then 
ask whether either outcome would be better, or would be the outcome 
that we ought to bring about. This subject we can call the ethics of dis-
tribution. 
Some writers reject this subject. For example, Nozick claims that 
we should not ask what would be the best distribution, since that ques-
tion wrongly assumes that there is something to be distributed. Most 
goods, Nozick argues, arc not up for distribution, or redistribution.3 
They are goods to which particular people already have entitlements, 
or special claims. To decide what justice demands, we cannot look merely 
at the abstract pattern: at how well off, in the different outcomes, dif-
ferent people would be. We must know these people's histories, and 
how each situation came about. Others make similar claims about 
merit, or desert. To be just, these writers claim, we must give everyone 
their due, and people's dues depend entirely on the differences be-
tween them, and on what they have done. As before, it is these other 
facts which arc morally decisive. 
These objections we can here set aside. We can assume that, in the 
cases we are considering, there are no such differences between peo-
ple. No one deserves to be better off than anyone else; nor docs any-
one have entitlements, or special claims. Since there arc some cases of 
this kind, we have a subject. If we can reach conclusions, we can then 
consider how widely these apply. Like Rawls and others, I believe that, 
at the fundamental level, most cases arc of this kind. But that can be 
argued later.4 
There are many ways in which, in one of two outcomes, people can 
be worse off. They may be poorer, or less happy, or have fewer op-
portunities, or worse health, or shorter lives. Though the difference 
between these cases often matters, I shall be discussing some general 
claims, which apply to them all. 
To ask my questions, we need only two assumptions. First, some peo-
ple can be worse off than others, in ways that arc morally relevant. Sec-
ond, these differences can be matters of degree. For example, A could 
be much worse off than B, who is slightly worse off than C. 
In describing my examples, I shall use figures. One description might 
be: 
(1) A is at20 
(2) A is at25 
B is at 10 
B is at9 
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Though such figures suggest precision, that is misleading. Such dif: 
ferences arc, I believe, even in reality imprecise. These figures merely 
show that the choice between these outcomes makes much more dif-
ference to A, but that, in both outcomes, B would be much worse ofT. 
That is what Nagel assumes about his two imagined children. 
One point about my ligures is important. Each extra unit is a 
roughly equal benefit, however well ofT the person is who receives it. 
If someone rises from 99 to 100, this person benefits as much as some-
one else who rises from 9 to 10. Without this assumption we cannot 
make sense of some of our questions. We cannot ask, for example, 
whether some benerit would matter more if it came to someone who 
was worse ofT. Consider Nagel's claim that, in his example, it would be 
more urgent to benefit the handicapped child. Nagel tells us to assume 
that, compared with the healthy child, the handicapped child would 
benefit less. Without this assumption, as he notes, his example would 
not test the value of equality. Nagel's conclusion is egalitarian because 
he believes that it is the lesser benefit which matters more. 
For each extra unit to be an equal benefit, however well ofT the re-
cipient is, these units cannot be thought of as equal quantities of re-
sources. The same increase in resources usually brings greater bencrits 
to those who are worse ofT. But these benefits need not be thought of 
in narrowly Utilitarian terms: as involving only happiness and the re-
lief of suffering, or the fulrihnent of desire. These benefits might in-
clude improvements in health, or length oflife, or education, or other 
substantive goods.5 
I 
\\'hat do Egalitarians believe? The obvious answer is: they believe 
in equality. On this dcrinition, most of us are Egalitarians, since most 
of us believe in some kind of equality. We believe in political equality, 
or equality before the law, or we believe that everyone has equal rights, 
or that everyone's interests should be given equal weight.6 
Though these kinds of equality arc of great importance, they arc 
not my subject. I am concerned with people's being equally well of!. To 
count as Egalitarians, in my sense, this is the kind of equality in which 
we must believe. 
There are two main ways in which we can believe in equality. We 
may believe that inequality is bad. On such a view, when we should aim 
for equality, that is because we shall thereby make the outcome bet-
ter. We can then be called Teleological--or, for short Telic-Egalitari-
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ans. Our view may instead be Deontologicalor, for short, Deontic. We may 
believe we should aim for equality, not to make the outcome better, 
but for some other moral reason. We may believe, for example, that 
people have rights to equal shares. (We might of course have beliefs 
of both kinds. We might believe we should aim for equality both be-
cause this will make the outcome better, and for other reasons. But 
such a view does not need a separate discussion. It is enough to con-
sider its components.) 7 
We can first consider Telic Egalitarians. These accept 
The Principle of f!rality: It is in itself bad if some people are worse 
off than others. 
In a fuller statement of this principle, we would need to assess the rel-
ative badness of different patterns of inequality. But we can here ig-
nore these complications.9 
Suppose next that the people in some community could all be ei-
ther ( 1) equally well off, or (2) equally badly off. The Principle of Equal-
ity does not tell us that (2) would be worse. This principle is about the 
badness of inequality; and, though it would be clearly worse if every-
one were equally worse off, our ground for thinking this cannot be egal-
itarian. 
To explain why (2) would be worse, we might appeal to 
The Principle of Utility: It is in itself better if people arc better off. 
When people would be on average better off, or would receive a greater 
net sum of benefits, we can say, for short, that there would be more 
utility. (But, as I have said, these benefits need not be thought of in 
narrowly utilitarian terms.) 
If we cared only about equality, we would be Pure Egalitarians. If we 
cared only about utility, we would be Pure Utilitarians--or what are nor-
mally just called Utilitarians. But most of us accept a pluralist view: one 
that appeals to more than one principle or value. On what I shall call 
the Pluralist Egalitarian View, we believe that it would be better both if 
there was more equality, and if there was more utility. In deciding which 
of two outcomes would be better, we give weight to both these values. 
These values may conflict. One of two outcomes may be in one way 
worse, because there would be more inequality, but in another way bet-
ter, because there would be more utility, or a greater sum of benefits. 
We must then decide which of these two facts would be more impor-
tant. Consider, for example, the following possible states of affairs: 
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( 1) Everyone at 150 
(2) Halfat 199 
(3) Halfat 101 
Halfat200 
Halfat200 
For Pure Egalitarians, (I) is the best of these three outcomes, since it 
contains less inequality than both (2) and (3). For Utilitarians, (I) is the 
worst of these outcomes, since it contains les.'i utility than both (2) and 
(3). (In a move from (1) to (3), the benefits to the half who gained would 
be slightly greater than the losses to the half who lost.) For most Plu-
ralist Egalitarians, (I) would be neither the best nor the worst of these 
outcomes. (I) would be all-things-<:onsidered worse than (2), since it would 
be much worse in terms of utility, and only slight f)• better in terms of equal-
ity. Similarly, (I) would be all-thingS<onsidered better than (3), since 
it would be much better in tenns of equality, and only slightly worse in 
terms of utility. 
In many cases the Pluralist View is harder to apply. Compare 
(1) Everyone at 150 
with 
(4) HalfatN Halfat200. 
If we arc Pluralist Egalitarians, for which values of Nwould we believe 
(I) to be worse than ( 4)? For some range of values-such as 120 to 150-
we may find this question hard to answer. And this case is unusually sim-
ple. Patterns of inequality can be much harder to assess. 
As such cases show, if we give weight to both equality and utility, we 
have no principled way to assess their relative importance. To defend a 
particular decision, we can only claim that it seems right. (Rawls there-
fore calls this view intuitionist.) 
I have said that, for Telic Egalitarians, inequality is bad. That seems 
to me the heart of this view. But I shall keep the familiar claim that, on 
this view, equality has value. It would be pedantic to claim instead that 
inequality has disvalue. 
We should next distinguish two kinds of value. If we claim that equal-
ity has value, we may only mean that it has good effects. Equality has many 
kinds of good effect, and inequality many kinds of bad effect. If people 
are unequal, for example, that can produce conflict, or envy, or put some 
people in the power of others. If we value equality because we arc con-
cerned with such effects, we believe tl1at equality has instrumental value: 
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we think it good as a means. But I am concerned with a different idea. 
For true Egalitarians, equality has intrinsic value. Ao; Nagel claims, it 'is 
in itself good'. 
This distinction, as we shall sec, is theoretically important And it makes 
a practical difference. If we believe that, besides having bad effects, in-
equality is in itself bad, we shall think it to be worse. And we shall think 
it bad even when it has no bad effects. 
Nagel sometimes blurs this distinction. He mentions two kinds of 
argument 'for the intrinsic value of equality' 10; but neither seems to 
deserve this description. 
The first kind of argument is individualistic, since it appeals to what 
is good or bad for individuals. Nagel's example is the claim that, when 
there is inequality, this weakens the self-respect of those people who 
are worse off. But what is claimed to be bad here is not inequality it-
self, but only one of its effects. Nor, to judge this effect bad, need we 
be egalitarians. Other effects we may think bad only because our con-
ception of well-being is in part egalitarian. Thus we may think it bad 
for people if they are servile or too deferential, even if this does not 
frustrate their desires, or affect their experienced well-being. But 
though such a view is, in one way, egalitarian, it too does not claim that 
equality has intrinsic value. As before, it claims only that inequality has 
bad effects. 
Nagel's second type of argument is communitarian. According to this 
argument, he writes, 
equality is good for society taken as a whole. It is a condition of 
the right kind of relations among its members, and of the for-
mation in them of healthy fraternal attitudes, desires, and sym-
pathies. 
For this to be a different type of argument, it must claim that such re-
lations are not merely good for people, but have intrinsic value. This, 
however, would still not be the claim that equality has intrinsic value. 
What would be claimed to be good would still not be equality itself, 
but only some of its effects.11 
The difference can be shown like this. Consider what I shall call 
the Divided World. This contains two groups of people, each unaware 
of the other's existence. Perhaps the Atlantic has not yet been crossed. 
Consider next two possible states of this world: 
(1) Half at 100 
(2) Half at 140 
Halfat200 
Halfat 140 
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Of these two states, (I) is in one way better than (2), since people arc 
on average better off. But we may believe that, all things considered, 
(I) is worse than (2). How could we explain this view? 
If we arc Tclic Egalitarians, our explanation would he this. While 
it is good that, in (I), people arc on average better off, it is bad that 
some people arc worse ofT than others. The badness of this inequality 
morally outweighs the extra benefits. 
In making such a claim, we could not appeal to inequality's ef-
fects. Since the two halves of the world's population arc quite un-
connected, the inequality in (1) has no bad effects on the worse-off 
group. Nor docs the equality in (2) produce desirable fraternal re-
lations between the two groups. If we are to claim that (I) is worse 
because of its inequality, we must claim that this inequality is in it-
self bad. 
Suppose we decide that, in this example, (I) is not worse than (2). 
Would this show that, in our view, inequality is not in itself bad? 
This would depend on our answer to another question. "\1\'hat 
should be the srope of an egalitarian view? Who arc the people who, 
ideally, should be equally well ofl? 
The simplest answer would be: everyone who ever lives. And, on 
the Telic View, this seems the natural answer. If it is in itself bad if some 
people arc worse off than others, why should it matter where or when 
these people live? On such a view, it is in ito;clfhad if there arc or have 
been, even in unrelated communities, and in different centuries, peo-
ple who arc not equally well off. Thus it is bad iflnca peasant-;, or Stone 
Age hunter-gatherers, were worse off than we arc now. 
We may reject this view. We may believe that, if two groups of peo-
ple are quite unrelated, it is in no way bad if they are not equally well 
off. This might be why, in my example, we deny that ( 1) is worse than 
(2). 
If that is our reaction, might we still believe that, when it holds be-
tween related groups, inequality is in itself bad? This seems unlikely. 
Why is it only in these cases that we object to inequality? Why would it 
make a diflcrcnce if these groups were not aware of each other's ex-
istence? The obvious answer is that, in such cases, inequality cannot 
have its usual bad effect<;. It would be coherent to claim that inequal-
ity is in ito;clfbad, but only when it holds between related groups. But, 
though coherent, this view does not seem plausible, since it would in-
volve a strange coincidence. 
We might claim, more plausibly, that inequality is in itself bad, but 
only when it holds within one community. But that would suggest that 
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our real view is that such inequality involves social injustice. And we 
may then be Deonlic Egalitarians. 
n 
Let us now consider this second kind of view. Deontic Egalitarians 
believe that, though we should sometimes aim for equality, that is not 
because we shall thereby make the outcome better, but is always for 
some other reason. On such a view, it is not in itself good if people are 
equally well off, or bad if they are not. 
Such a view typically appeals to claims about justice. More exactly, 
it appeals to claims about comparative justice. Whether people are un-
justly treated, in this comparative sense, depends on whether they are 
treated differently from other people. Thus it may be unfair if, in a dis-
tribution of resources, some people arc denied their share. Fairness 
may require that, if such goods are given to some, they should be 
given to all. 
Another kind of justice is concerned with treating people as they 
deserve. This kind of justice is non-comparative. Whether people are un-
justly treated, in this sense, depends only on facts about them. It is ir-
relevant whether others are treated differently. Thus, if we treated no 
one as they deserved, this treatment would be unjust in the non-
comparative sense. But, if we treated everyone equally unjustly, there 
would be no comparative injustice. 12 
It is sometimes hard to distinguish these two kinds of justice, and 
there arc difficult questions about the relation between them. 13 One 
point should be mentioned here. Non-comparative justice may tell us 
to produce equality. Perhaps, if everyone were equally deserving, we 
should make everyone equally well off. But such equality would be 
merely the effect of giving people what they deserved. Only compara-
tive justice makes equality our aim. 
When I said that, in my examples, no one deserves to be better off 
than others, I did not mean that everyone is equally deserving. I meant 
that, in these cases, we are considering benefits that no one deserves. 
So it is only comparative justice with which we shall be concerned. 
There is another relevant distinction. In some cases, justice is purely 
procedural. It requires only that we act in a certain way. For example, 
when some good cannot be divided, we may be required to conduct a 
fair lottery, which gives everyone an equal chance to receive this good. 
In other cases, justice is in part substantive. Here too,justice may require 
a certain kind of procedure; but there is a separate criterion of what 
8 
the outcome ought to be. One example would be the claim that peo-
ple should be given equal shares. 
There is an intermediate case. justice may require a certain outcome, 
but only because this avoids a procedural flaw. One such flaw is partiality. 
Suppose that we have to distribute certain publicly owned goods. If we 
could easily divide these goods, others might be rightly suspicious if we 
gave to different people unequal shares. That might involve favouritism, 
or wrongful discrimination. 14 We may thus believe that, to avoid these 
flaws, we should distribute these goodo; equally. The same conclw;ion might 
be reached in a slightly different way. We may think that, in such a case, 
equality is the defimll: that we need some moral reason if we arc to jus-
tify giving to some people more than we give to others. 
How docs this view differ from a view that requires equality for sub-
stantive reasons? One difference is this. Suppose that we have manifestly 
tried to distribute equally, but our procedure has innocently failed. If 
we aimed for equality only to avoid the taint of partiality or discrimi-
nation, tl1ere would be no case for correcting the rcsuJt. 1!i 
We can now rcdescribe my two kinds of Egalitarian. On the Telic 
View, inequality is bad; on the Deontic View, it is unjust. 
It may be objected that, when inequality is unjust, it is, for that rca-
son, bad. But this does not undermine this way of drawing our distinc-
tion. On the Deontic View, injustice is a special kind of badness, one 
that necessarily involves wrong-doing. When we claim that inequality is 
unjust, our objection is not really to the inequality itself. What is un-
just, and therefore bad, is not strictly the state of affairs, but the way in 
which it was produced. 
There is one kind of case which most clearly separates our two kindo; 
of view. These arc cases where some inequality cannot be avoided. For 
Deontic Egalitarians, if nothing can be done, there can be no ir~justice. 
In Rawls's words, if some situation 'is unalterable ... the question of 
justice does not arisc.' 16 
Consider, for example, the inequality in our natural endowments. 
Some of us are born more talented or healthier than others, or arc 
more fortunate in other ways. If we arc Dcontic Egalitarians, we shall 
not believe tl1at such inequality is in itself bad. We might agree that, 
if we cortld distribute talents, it would he unjust or unfair to distribute 
them unequally. But, except when there are bad effects, we shall see 
nothing to regret in the inequalities produced by the random shuffling 
of our genes. 
Many Telic Egalitarians take a different view. They believe that, even 
when such inequality is unavoidable, it is in itself badP 
9 
III 
It is worth developing here some remarks of Rawls. As I have said, 
Rawls assumes that injustice essentially involves wrongdoing. When he 
discusses the inequality of our inherited talents, he writes: 
The natural distribution is neither just nor unjust ... These are 
simply natural facts. What is just and unjust is the way that in-
stitutions deal with these facL'I. 
This may suggest a purely deontic view. But Rawls continues: 
Aristocratic and caste societies are unjust because ... the basic 
structure of these societies incorporates the arbitrariness found 
in nature. But there is no necessity for men to resign themselves 
to these contingencies. 18 
This use of the word resign seems to assume that natural inequality is 
bad. And Rawls elsewhere writes that, in a society governed by his 
principles, we need no longer 'view it as a misforlune that some are by 
nature better endowed than others'. These remarks suggest that Rawls 
is in part a Telic Egalitarian. An objection to natural inequality is, I be-
lieve, one of the foundations of his theory, and one of its driving 
forces. If Rawls denies that such inequality is unjust, that may only be 
because he wishes to preserve the analytic link between injustice and 
wrong-doing. And, given the substance of his theory, that may be 
merely a terminological decision. 
Rawls's objection to natural inequality is not so much that it is bad, 
but that it is morally arbitrary. This objection, as Rawls suggests, can 
be reapplied at several points in one natural line of thought. 
We can start with external goods. In some cases, we enjoy resources 
whose availability, or discovery, is in no sense due to us. Such resources 
simply appear, like manna falling from the sky. There will be inequality 
if such manna falls unequally on different people. Let us call these wind-
JaUcases. 
In such cases, the inequality is entirely due to differences in the 
bounty of nature. Such differences are, in the dearest sense, morally 
arbitrary. If some people receive less than others, that is merely their 
bad luck. Since such inequalities have this arbitrary cause, we may con-
clude that they are bad. Or we may conclude that we ought to redress 
these inequalities, by a redistribution of resources. 
Consider next cases in which we arc not merely passive. We do some 
work, either in discovering resources, or in converting them for use. 
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We plant seeds, prospect and mine, or fish the sea; we till the soil, and 
manufacture goods. 
Suppose that we all work equally hard, and with equal skill. In such 
cases, the human input is the same. But there may still be inequality 
between us, which results from differences in the natural input. These 
might be diflercnces in mineral wealth, or in the climate, or in the fruit-
fulness of the soil, or sea. Because of such variations, some of us may 
soon become much beucr ofT than others. These arc cases of fJroduc-
tive luck. 19 
Some of these cases hardly diller from pure wirulf;tlls. Perhaps we 
merely have to shake our trees, or stroll over to where the fruit fell. 
And all these cases may seem relevantly similar. Since we all work 
equally hard, and with equal skill, the inequality is again due to dif-
ferences in the bounty of nature, which we believe to be morally ar-
bitrary. Can the other clement, the equal human input, make this fact 
irrelevant? Can it justify the resulting inequality? We may decide that 
it cannot, and that such inequality also calls for redistribution. 
Now consider inequality of a third kind. In these cases, there are 
no differences either in external resources, or in the efforts people make. 
The inequality is emirely due to difl'crenccs in people's native talents. 
These are ca'icS of genetic luck.20 
We may decide that such genetic differences arc, in the relevant 
respect, like difl"crcnces in nature's bounty. Ao; Rawls says, they arc not 
deserved. Our native talents arc inner resources, which, like manna, 
merely fell upon us. 
In some of these cases, people receive greater rewards simply for 
harlingccrtain natural endowments. These arc like pure windfalls. But, 
in most of these cases, people develop and usc the talents with which 
they were born. We must ask again whether this infusion of effort can-
cels out the arbitrariness of genetic luck. Can it justify the resulting in-
equalities? 
This may be the most important question in this whole debate. Many 
people answer Yes. But, like Rawls and Nagel, we may answer No. We 
may conclude that these inequalities should also be redressed. 
Consider next a fourth kind of case. The natural input is the same, 
and we all have equal talents. But inequality results from differences 
in how hard we work. These are cases of differential tfforl. 
\Vc must here note one complication. There arc two uncontrover-
sial ways in which, when people work harder, they should sometimes be 
paid more. They may work for a longer time, or in a more unpleasant 
way. In such cases, overtime or hardship pay may be mere compcnsa-
II 
lion, which does not create real inequality. These are not the cases that 
I have in mind. I am thinking of people who enjoy working hard, and 
who, because they do, become much better off than others. 
Of those who appeal to the arbitrariness of the natural lottery, many 
stop here. Differences in effort seem to them to justifY such inequality. 
But we may press on. Such differences involve two elements: the ability 
to make an effort, and the decision to try. We may decide that the first 
is merely another native talent, which cannot justify inequality. 
This leaves only inequalities that are the result of choice. To most 
Egalitarians, these inequalities are of no concern. That is why some writ-
ers argue for equality, not of well-being, but of opportunity for well-
being.21 But some of us may still press on. We may decide that it is bad 
if some people are worse off than others, even when this is merely be-
cause these people do not enjoy working hard, or because, for some other 
reason, they make choices that leave them worse off. These may seem 
to be merely other kinds of bad luck. 
The line of thought that I have just sketched raises many questions. 
I shall make only three brief comments. 
First, to some people this reasoning may seem a reductio. If these 
people find the last step absurd, they may be led to reject the others. 
But that would be too swift, since there could be grounds for stopping 
earlier. 
Second, we should state more clearly what such reasoning might show. 
The reasoning appeals to the claim that certain kinds ofinequality have 
a morally arbitrary cause. Such a claim might show that such inequality 
is not justified. But it may not show that such inequality is unjustified, 
and ought to be redressed. These are quite different conclusions. 
If such inequality is not justified, people have no positive claim to 
their advantages, or to the resources which they now control But this 
conclusion only dears the decks. It means that, if there is a moral rea-
son for redistribution, those who are better off can have no principled 
objection. It would be a further claim that there is such a reason, and 
that the aim of such redistribution should be to produce equality.22 
The difference can be shown like this. Utilitarians would also claim 
that, if some distribution of resources has an arbitrary natural cause, it 
is not justified. Since that is so, they would claim, there can be no ob-
jection to redistribution. But, on their view, the best distribution is the 
one that would maximize the sum ofbenefits. Such a distribution would 
not be morally arbitrary. But it may not be an equal distribution. 
Third, Rawls regards Utilitarians as his main opponents. At the level 
of theory, he may be right. But the questions I have been discussing are, 
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in practice, more important If nature gave to some of us more n .... 
sources, have we a moral claim to keep these resources, and the wealth 
they bring? If we happen to be born with greater talents, and in cons<.'-
qucnce produce more, have we a claim to greater rewards? In practical 
terms, Rawls's main opponents are those who answer Yes to such ques-
tions. Egalitarians and Utilitarians both answer No. Both agree that 
such inequalities arc not justified. In this disagreement, Rawls, Mill, and 
Sidgwick are on the same side. 
IV 
I have distinguished two kinds of Egalitarian view. On the Tclic 
View, we believe that inequality is in itself bad, or unfair. On the De-
antic View, our concern about equality is only a concern about what 
we should do. 
Why does this distinction matter? It has theoretical implications. 
As we shall later see, these views can be defended or attacked in dif:. 
fercnt ways. There are also practical implications, some of which I shall 
mention now. 
Each view has many versions. That is especially true of the Dean-
tic View, which is really a group of views. Telic and Deontic Views might, 
in practice, coincide. It might be true that, whenever the first view claims 
that some kind of inequality is bad, the second claims that we should 
prevent it, if we can. But when we look at the versions of these views 
that are in fact advanced, and found plausible, we find that they often 
conflict. 
The Telic View is likely to have wider scope. A'! I have said, if we 
think it in itself bad if some people are worse off than others, we may 
think this bad whoever these people are. It may seem to make no dif-
ference where these people li\'e: whether they arc in the same or dif-
ferent communities. We may also think it irrelevant what the respects 
arc in which some people are worse off than others: whether they have 
less income, or worse health, or arc less fortunate in other ways. i\ny 
inequality, if undeserved and unchosen, we may think bad. Nor, third, 
will it seem to make a difference how such inequality arose. That is im-
plied by the very notion of intrinsic badness. If some state is in il'lclf 
bad, it is irrelevant how it came about. 
If we are Deontic Egalitarians, our view may have none of these 
features. 
Though there are many versions of the Deontic View, one large 
group are broadly contractarian. Such views often appeal to the ideas 
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of reciprocity, or mutual benefit. On some views of this kind, when goods 
are co-operatively produced, and no one has special claims, all the con-
tributors should get equal shares. There are here two restrictions. 
First, what is shared arc only the fruits of co-operation. Nothing is said 
about other goods, such as those that come from nature. Second, the 
distribution covers only those who produce these goods. Those who 
cannot contribute, such ao; the handicapped, or children, or future gen-
erations, have no claims.23 
Other views of this type are less restrictive. They may cover all the 
members of the same community, and all types of good. But they still 
exclude outo;iders. It is irrelevant that those other people may be far 
worse off. 
On such views, if there is inequality between people in different 
communities, this need not be anyone's concern. Since the greatest 
inequalities are on this global scale, this restriction has immense im-
portance. (Here is one way to make this point. If Egalitarians oppose 
inequality only within particular communities, their view may, on a global 
scale, call for less redistribution than a Utilitarian view.) 
Consider next the question of causation. The Tclic View naturally 
applies to all cases. On this view, we always have a reason to prevent 
or reduce inequality, if we can. 
If we arc Dcontic Egalitarians, we might think the same. But that 
is less likely. Since our view is not about the goodness of outcomes, it 
may cover only inequalities that result from acts, or only those that arc 
intentionally produced. And it may tell us to be concerned only with 
the inequalities that we ourselves produce. 
Here is one example. In a highly restricted way, Gauthier is a Dc-
ontic Egalitarian. Thus he writes that 'If there were a distributor of nat-
ural assets ... we might reasonably suppose that in so far as possible 
shares should be equal. '2·1 But, when assets are distributed by nature, 
Gauthier has no objection to inequality. He sees no ground to undo 
the effects of the natural lottery. 
On such a view, when we are responsible for some distribution, we 
ought to distribute equally. But, when we are not responsible, in-
equality is not unjust. In such cases, there is nothing morally amiss. We 
have no reason to remove such inequality, by redistribution. 
Is this a defensible position? Suppose we are about to distribute some 
resources. We agree that we ought to give people equal shares. A gust 
of wind snatches these resources from our hands, and distributes them 
unequally. Have we then no reason to redistribute? 
It makes a difference here why we believe that we ought to distribute 
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equally. Suppose, first, that our concern is with procedural justice. We 
believe that we should distribute equally because that is the only way 
to avoid partiality. Or we believe that equality is the default: what we 
should aim for when we cannot justify distributing unequally. When 
there is natur.tl inequality, neither belief applies. Nature is not dis-
criminatory; nor is she an agent, who must justify what she does. On 
such a view, if we distribute, we should distribute equally. But we have 
no ground for thinking that we should distribute. If the distributor is 
Nature, there has been no partiality. Nothing needs to be undone. 
Suppose, next, that we are concerned with substantive justice. Our 
aim is not merely to avoid procedural flaws, since we have a separate 
criterion for what the result should be. On such a view, we might be-
lieve that, wherever possible, we should intervene, to produce the 
right result. But, as before, that belief need not be part of such a view. 
As in the case of procedural justice, we might believe only that, if we 
distribute, we should distribute equally. When inequality arises natu-
rally, our view may not apply. 
Things are different on the Tclic View, according to which such 
inequality is in itself bad, or ur~ust. On this view, we have a reason to 
redistribute. The onus of the argument shifL'>. If people oppose redis-
tribution, they must provide contrary reasons. 
It is worth memioning some of these reasons. Some would claim 
that, even if we should distribute equally, once there hao; been a nat-
ural distribution, it is wrong to intervene. Such a claim may seem to 
assume that what is natur.tl is right, or that the status quo is privileged-
assumptions that are now hard to defend. But there arc other ways in 
which people might defend such claims. They might appeal to the dif-
ference between acts and omissions, or between negative and positive 
duties, or something of the kind.25 
In some cases, such a view is plausible. Suppose that some natural 
process threatens to kill many people. We could save them if we in-
tervened, and killed one person as a means to save the many. Many 
believe that, even though the deaths of many would be a worse out-
come than the death of one, we ought not to intervene in such a way. 
We should allow this natural process to bring about the worse of these 
two outcomes. 
Could we apply such a view to inequality? If some natural process 
has distributed resources in an unequal way, could it be similarly 
claimed that, though such inequality makes the outcome worse, we ought 
not to intervene? That seems less plausible. In the case of killing, our 
objection might appeal to the special features of this act, our relation 
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to the person killed, her right not to be injured, or to the fact that her 
death is used as a means. There seem to be no such features when we 
correct a natural distribution. If the wind blows more manna into the 
laps of certain people, and we conceded that, as an outcome, this is 
worse, there seems no ground for a constraint against redistribution. 
If we remove and redistribute these people's extra manna, so that 
everyone has equal shares, we do not injure these people, or use them 
as a means. 
It may next be claimed that, once a natural distribution has occurred, 
people acquire entitlements. In pure windfall cases, such a claim seems 
far-fetched. The fact that the manna fell on you does not make it yours. 
But similar claims arc widely made. Thus it may be said that you staked 
out a valid claim to the ground on which the manna fell, and that this 
makes it yours. Or it may be said that, once you interact with the 
manna-or mix your labour with it-it becomes yours. 
Such claims may have some force if they are made within some ex-
isting institutional scheme, or agreement But we are here discussing 
a more fundamental question. What should our institutions, or agree-
ments, be? If such claims are not convincing, as answers to that ques-
tion, we may conclude that, in pure windfall cases, we ought to 
redistribute. It may then be harder to defend such claims in cases of 
productive luck. If we reject such claims here, it may then be harder 
to defend them in cases of genetic luck, and so on down the series. 
For those who hold a Deontic View, there is no need even to make 
these claims. On such a view, since natural inequality is not in itself 
bad, there is no argument for redistribution; so there need not be an 
argument against This, for conservatives, is a stronger position. 
v 
Let us now consider two objections to the Telic View. 
On the widest version of this view, any inequality is bad. It is bad, 
for example, that some people are sighted and others arc blind. We 
would therefore have a reason, if we could, to take single eyes from 
some of the sighted and give them to the blind.That may seem a hor-
rific conclusion. 
If Egalitarians wish to avoid this conclusion, they might claim that 
their view applies only to inequality in resources. But, as Nozick says, 
such a restriction may be hard to explain. If natural inequality is in it-
selfbad, why is that not true of the inequality between the sighted and 
the blind? 
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Should we be horrified by this conclusion? To set aside some ir-
relevant complications, let us purify the example. Suppose that, after 
some genetic change, people are henceforth born as twins, one of whom 
is always blind. And suppose that, as a universal policy, operations are 
performed after every birth, in which one eye from the sighted twin is 
transplanted into its blind sibling. That would be a forcible redistrib-
ution, since new-born babies cannot give consent. But I am inclined 
to believe that such a policy would be justified. 
Some of us may disagree. We may believe that people have rights 
to keep the organs with which they were born. But that belief would 
not give us grounds to reject the Tclic View. Egalitarians could agree 
that the State should not redistribute organs. Since they do not believe 
equality to be the only vc~.lue, they could think that, in this example, 
some other principle has greater weight. Their bcliefis only that, if we 
all had one eye, that would be in one wa·y better than if half of us had 
two eyes and the other half had none. Far from being monstrous, that 
belief is clearly true. If we all had one eye, that would be much better 
for all of the people who would otherwise be blind.26 
A second objection is more serious. If inequality is bad, its disap-
pearance must be in one way a change for the better, however this 
change occurs. Suppose that those who are better off suffer some mis-
fortune, so that they become as badly off as everyone else. Since these 
events would remove the inequality, they must be in one way welcome, 
on the Telic View, even though they would be worse for some people, 
and better for no one. This implication seems to many to be quite ab-
surd. I call this the Levelling Down Objection. 27 
Consider first those Egalitarians who regret the inequalities in our 
natural endowments. On their view, it would be in one way better if 
we removed the eyes of the sighted, not to give them to the blind, but 
simply to make the sighted blind. That would be in one way better even 
if it was in noway better for the blind. This we may find impossible to 
believe. Egalitarians would avoid this form of the objection if what they 
think bad is only inequality in resources. But they must admit that, on 
their vi(!W, it would be in one way better if, in some natural disaster 
those who arc better off lost all of their extra resources, in a way that 
benefitted no one. That conclusion may seem almost as implausible. 
It is worth repeating that, to criticize Egalitarians by appealing to 
the Levelling Down Objection, it is not enough to claim that it would 
be wrong to produce equality by levelling down. As we have seen, since 
they are pluralists, Telic Egalitarians could accept that claim. Our ob-
jection must be that, if we achieve equality by levelling down, there is 
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nothing good about what we have done. And we must claim that, if some 
natural disaster makes everyone equally badly ofT, that is not in any way 
good news. These claims do contradict the Telic Egalitarian View, 
even in its pluralist form. 
I shall return to the Levelling Down Objection. The point to no-
tice now is that, on a Deontic view, we can avoid all forms of this ob-
jection. If we are Deontic Egalitarians, we do not believe that inequality 
is bad, so we arc not forced to admit that, on our view, it would be in 
one way better if inequality were removed by levelling down. We can 
believe that we have a reason to remove inequality only wizen, and only 
because, our way of doing so benefits the people who arc worse ofT. Or 
we might believe that, when some people are worse ofT than others, 
through no fault or choice of theirs, they have a special claim to be 
raised up to the level of the others, but they have no claim that others 
be brought down to their level. 
VI 
There arc, then, several differences between the Tclic and Dean-
tic Views. Though these views might coincide, they are likely to have 
different scope, and different implications. And, as we have just seen, 
they can be challenged in different ways. If we are Egalitarians, it is thus 
important to decide which kind of view we hold. 
If we are impressed by the Levelling Down Objection, we may be 
tempted by the Dcontic View. But, if we give up the Telic View, we may 
find it harder to justifY some of our beliefs. If inequality is not in itself 
bad, we may find it harder to explain, for example, why we should re-
distribute resources. 
Some of our beliefs would also have to go. Reconsider the Divided 
World, in which the two possible states are these: 
(1) Half at 100 
(2) Halfat 140 
Halfat200 
Half at 140 
In outcome (1) there is inequality. But, since the two groups arc un-
aware of each other's existence, this inequality was not deliberately pro-
duced, or maintained. Since this inequality docs not involve wrong-doing, 
there is no i~ustice. On the Deontic View, there is nothing more to 
say. On this view, we cannot claim that (1) is worse than (2). If we be-
lieve that ( 1) is worse, and because of the inequality, we must accept 
the Telic form of the Egalitarian View. We must claim that the inequality 
in (I) is in itself bad. 
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We might, however, give a different explanation. Rather than be-
lieving in equality, we might be especially concerned about those peo-
ple who are worse ofT. That could be our reason for preferring (2). 
Let us now consider this alternative. 
VII 
In discussing his imaged case, Nagel writes: 
If one chose to move to the city, it would be an egalitarian de-
cision. It is more urgent to benefit the second child ... This ur-
gency is not necessarily decisive.lt may be outweighed by other 
considerations, for equality is not the only value. But it is a fac-
tor, and it depends on the worse ofT position of the second child. 
An improvement in his situation is more important than an equal 
or somewhat greater improvement in the situation of the first 
child.28 
This passage contains the idea that equality has value. But it gives 
more prominence to another idea. Nagel believes it is more important 
to benefit the child who is worse ofT. That idea can lead us to a quite 
different view. 
Consider first those people who are badly ofT: those who arc suf-
fering, or destitute, or those whose fundamental needs have not been 
met. It is widely claimed that we should give priority to helping such 
people. This would be claimed even by Utilitarians, since, if people arc 
badly off, they are likely to be easier to help. 
I am concerned with a different view. On this view, it is more ur-
gent to help these people even if they arc harder to help. While Utili-
tarians claim that we should give these people priority when, and 
because, we can help them mare, this view claims that we should give 
them priority, even when we can help them less. That is what makes 
this a distinctive view. 
Some apply this view only to the two groups of the well ofT and the 
badly off.29 But I shall consider a more general version ofthis view, which 
can be applied to everyone. On what I shall call 
11le Priarity View: Benefiting people matters more the worse off 
these people are. 
For Utilitarians, the moral importance of each benefit depends only 
on how great this benefit would be. For Priaritarians, it also depends 
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on how well off the person is to whom this benefit comes. We should 
not give equal weight to equal benefits, whoever receives them. Ben-
efits to the worse off should be given more weighL 30 
Like the Egalitarian Pluralist View, this view is, in Rawls's sense, in-
tuitionist. It does not tell us how much priority we should give to those 
who are worse off. On this view, benefits to the worse off could be morally 
outweighed by sufficient benefits to the better off. To decide what would 
be sufficient, we must simply use our judgement. 
Like the belief in equality, the Priority View can take either Tclic 
or Deontic forms. It can be a view about which outcomes would be bet-
ter, or a view that is only about what we ought to do. But, for most of 
my discussion, this difference does not matter. 
VIII 
Let us now look more closely at this view. To whom should we give 
priority? Here arc three answers: 
(I) those who are worse off in their lives as a whole, 
(2) those who are worse ofT at the time, 
(3) those who have needs that are morally more urgent. 
(I) and (2) frequently diverge. One of two people may be worse off 
now, even though she has earlier been, and will later be, much better 
ofT. 
(2) and (3), in contrast, usually coincide. If one of two people has 
more urgent needs, she is likely to be worse ofT at the time. But, on 
some views about the urgency of needs, that is not always true. Com-
pare A, who is disabled, with the less fortunate but able-bodied B. A's 
need for a wheel-chair may be claimed to be more urgent than any of 
B's needs, even though A's other advantages make her, on the whole, 
better off.31 
The choice between (I) and (2) is the choice ofwhat Nagel calls 
units for distributive principles: the items to which we apply these prin-
ciples.32 Nagel takes these units to be 'individual persons, individual 
human lives'. And he writes, 'what makes a system egalitarian is the 
priority it gives to the claims of those whose overall life prospects put 
them at the bottom.' Rawls and many others take the same view. 
If lives arc the relevant units, tl1is increases the difTcrcnce between 
giving priority to those who are worse ofT, and giving priority to meet-
ing more urgent needs. 
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Nagel sometimes favours the second of these. Thus he claims that 
an egalitarian view 'establishes an order of priority among needs and 
gives preference to the most urgent'. And he writes: 
An arrangement must be acceptable first from the point of 
view of everyone's most basic claims, then from the point of view 
of everyone's next most basic claims, etc ... [T] he principles 
grant to each person the same claim to have his most urgent 
needs satisfied prior to the less urgent needs of anyone else. 33 
This implies that we should give priority to needs rather than persons. 
The more urgent needs of someone who, on the whole, is better off, 
take priority over the less urgent needs of someone who is worse off. 
Nagel seems to have overlooked this implication. Thus he also 
writes, 'Priority is given to individuals who, taking their lives as a whole, 
have more urgent nmls: 34 This claim conflatcs the distinction I have drawn. 
X's needs may now be more urgent than Ys, even though, in most of 
her life, X has been, and will later be, much better off than Y. If we 
should give priority to more urgent needs, we should help X. If we should 
give priority to those who arc worse off in their lives as a whole, we should 
helpY. 
Which answer should we give? Suppose that we could support one 
of two programs. The first would provide treatment for a painful ill-
ness that occasionally afflicts the rich. The second would benefit an 
equal number of the poor, by subsidising sports grounds, or seaside 
holidays. Which of these should have priority? 
For this case to be relevant, it must be true that, even without the 
treatment, the rich would on the whole be better off. And it must be 
true that our decision would make less differeme to them: that it would 
give them lesser benefits. We can thus suppose that the treatment in 
question would not bring much relief to this painful illness. Since the 
benefits to both groups would be hedonistic, they can be roughly es-
timated by an appeal to people's preferences. Let us suppose that 
everyone involved would prefer a seaside holiday, or a new sports 
ground, to the relief of this amount of suffering. 
Suppose we believe that, even in such a case, the relief of suffering 
should take priority. And suppose we take a similar view about other 
urgent needo;, such as those produced by disability. We then have a view 
which is not, in any way, egalitarian. We think it more important to 
give lesser benefits to people who, in the relevant sense, are better off. 
Such a view is not, I think, absurd. But, because it is so different, I 
shall ignore it here. I shall assume that, on the Priority View, we should 
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give priority, not to meeting special needs, but to benefiting those peo-
ple who are worse off. And I shall assume that, in my examples, there 
is no difference between those who would be worse off at the time, and 
those who would be worse off in their lives as a whole. 
IX 
What is the relation between the Priority View and Egalitarianism? 
On the Priority View, it is morally more important to benefit the 
people who are worse off. But this claim, by itself, does not define a 
different view, since it would be made by all Egalitarians. If we believe 
that we should aim for equality, we shall think it more important to 
benefit those who are worse off. Such benefits reduce inequality. If that 
is why we give such benefits priority, we do not hold the Priority View. 
On this view, as I define it here, we do not believe in equality. We give 
priority to the worse off, not because this will reduce inequality, but 
for other reasons. That is what makes this a distinctive view. 
As before, we may hold a mixed view. We may give priority to the 
worse off, partly because this will reduce inequality, and partly for 
other reasons. But such a view does not need a separate discussion. It 
is enough to consider the pure version of the Priority View. 
How does this view differ from an Egalitarian view? 
One difference is purely structural. As we have seen, equality can-
not plausibly be our only value. If we are Egalitarians, we must hold 
some more complicated view. Thus, on the Telic form of the Pluralist 
View, the belief that inequality is bad is combined with the belief that 
benefits are good. The Priority View, in contrast, can be held as a com-
plete moral view. This view contains the idea that benefits are good. 
It merely adds that benefits matter more the worse off the people are 
who receive them. Unlike the Principle of Equality, which might be 
combined with the Principle of Utility, the Priority View can replace 
that principle. It can be regarded as the only principle we need. 
The chief difference can be introduced like this. I have said that, on 
the Priority View, we do not believe in equality. We do not think it in it-
self bad, or unjust, that some people are worse off than others. This claim 
can be misunderstood. We do of course think it bad that some people 
arc worse off. But what is bad is not that these people are worse off than 
others. It is rather tl1at they are worse off than they might have been. 
Consider next tl1c central claim of the Priority View: benefits to the 
worse off matter more. The same ambiguity can lead one astray. On 
this view, if I am worse off than you, benefits to me arc more impor-
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tant. Is this because I am worse off than you? In one sense, yes. But this 
has nothing to do with my relation to you. 
It may help to usc this analogy. People at higher altitudes find it harder 
to breathe. Is this because they arc higher up than other people? In one 
sense, yes. But they would find it just as hard to breathe even if there 
were no other people who were lower down. In the same way, on the 
Priority View, benefits to the worse off matter more, but that is only be-
cause these people are at a lower absolute level. It is irrelevant that these 
people are worse off than others. Benefits to them would matter just as 
much even if there were no others who were better off. 
·The chief difference is, then, this. Egalitarians are concerned with 
relativities: with how each person's level compares with the level of other 
people. On the Priority View, we are concerned only with people's ab-
solute levels.35 
This is a fundamental structural difference. Because of this differ-
ence, there arc several ways in which these views have different impli-
cations. 
One example concerns scope. Tclic Egalitarians may, I have said, 
give their view wide scope. They may believe that inequality is bad even 
when it holds between people who have no connections with each other. 
But this can seem a dubious view. Why is it bad if, in some far off land, 
and quite unknown to me, there arc other people who are better off 
than me? 
On the Priority View, there is no ground for such doubts. This view 
naturally has universal scope. And that is true of both its telic and de-
antic forms. If it is more important to benefit one of two people, be-
cause this person is worse off, it is irrelevant whether these people are 
in the same community, or are aware of each other's existence. The 
greater urgency of benefiting this person does not depend on her re-
lation to the other person. It depends only on her lower absolute level. 
There are other ways in which, given the structural difference be-
tween these views, they are likely to have different implications. I can-
not discuss these here. But I have described the kind of case in which 
these views most deeply disagree. These arc the cases which raise the 
Levelling Down Objection. Egalitarians face this objection because they 
believe that inequality is in itself bad. If we accept the Priority View, 
we avoid this objection. We arc more concerned for people the worse 
off these people are. But, as we have just seen, it makes no difference 
to our concern whether there are other people who are better off. On 
this view, when inequality is not bad for people, it simply docs not mat-
ter. If the better off suffer some misfortune, so that they become as 
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badly off as anyone else, we do not think this in any way a change for 
the better. 
X 
I have explained the sense in which, on the Priority View, we do 
not believe in equality. Though we give priority to benefiting those who 
are worse off, that is not because such benefits reduce inequality. 
It may be objected that, on the Priority View, we shall often aim for 
equality. But that is not enough to make us Egalitarians. In the same 
way, Utilitarians often aim for equality, because inequality has bad ef-
fects. But Utilitarians are not Egalitarians, since they regard equality 
as a mere means. 
It is worth pursuing this analogy. There is an important Utilitarian 
reason to aim for equality, not of well-being, but of resources. This rea-
son appeals to diminishing marginal utility, or the claim that, if resources 
go to people who are better off, they will benefit these people less. Util-
itarians therefore argue that, whenever we transfer resources to those 
who are worse off, we shall produce greater benefits, and shall thereby 
make the outcome better. 
On the telic version of the Priority View, we appeal to a similar claim. 
We believe that, if benefits go to people who are better off, these ben-
efits matter less. Just as resources have diminishing marginal utility, so 
utility has diminishing marginal moral importance. Given the similarity 
between these claims, there is a second similar argument in favour of 
equality: this time, not of resources, but of well-being. On this argu-
ment, whenever we transfer resources to people who are worse off, the 
resulting benefits will not merely be, in themselves, greater. They will 
also, on the moral scale, matter more. There are thus two ways in which 
the outcome will be better. 
The Utilitarian argument in favour of equality of resources is, as 
Nagel says, a 'non-egalitarian instrumental argument'. It treats such 
equality as good, not in itself, but only because it increases the size of 
the resulting benefits. A similar claim applies to the Priority View. 
Here too, equality is good only because it increases the moral value of 
these benefits. 36 
There are, however, two differences. First, diminishing marginal 
utility is not a universal law. In some cases, if resources went to the peo-
ple who were better off, they would give these people greaterbenefits.37 
Utilitarians would then believe that we should transfer resources to these 
people. That would increase inequality. 
The law of diminishing moral goodness is, in contrast, quite secure. 
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As a moral claim, it always holds. On the Priority View, benefits to the 
worse off always matter more. This argument for equality is thus more 
securely grounded. But this docs not make it different in kind. Like 
the Utilitarian argument, it still treats equality as a mere means. 
A second difference goes deeper. Since diminishing marginal util-
ity is an empirical generalization, the Utilitarian argument for equal-
ity is, in a way, coincidental. It merely happens to be true that, if people 
arc better off, resources give them smaller benefits. 
On the Priority View, there is no coincidence. It does not merely 
happen to be true that, if people are worse off, benefits to them mat-
ter more. On this view, these benefits matter more because these peo-
ple are worse off. This is a fact, not about the size of these benefits, but 
about their distribution. And, in telling us to give priority to such ben-
efits, this view has what Nagel calls 'a built-in bias towards equality'. 
On the definition with which I began, the Priority View is not Egal-
itarian. On this view, though we ought to give priority to the worse off, 
that is not because we shall be reducing inequality. We do not believe 
that inequality is, in itself, either bad or unjust. But, since this view has 
a built-in bias towards equality, it could be called Egalitarian in a sec-
ond, looser sense. We might say that, if we take this view, we arc Non-
Relational Egalitarians. 
XI 
Though equality and priority arc different ideas, the distinction is 
often overlooked, with unfortunate results. 
It is worth suggesting why this distinction has been overlooked. First, 
especially in earlier centuries, Egalitarians were often fighting battles 
in which this distinction did not arise. They were demanding legal or 
political equality, or attacking arbitrary privileges, or differences in sta-
tus. These are not the kinds of good to which our distinction applies. 
And it is here that the demand for equality is most plausible. 
Second, when Egalitarians considered other kinds of good, they often 
assumed that, if equality were achieved, this would either increase the 
sum of these goods, or would at least not reduce this sum. If they thought 
of benefits in utilitarian terms, they may have assumed that the redis-
tribution of resources would increase the resulting benefits. If instead 
they were concerned only with resources, they may have regarded 
these as a fixed sum, which would not be altered by redistribution. In 
either of these cases, equality and priority cannot conflict. 
Third, even when a move to equality might reduce the total sum 
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of benefits, Egalitarians often assumed that such a move would at least 
bring some benefits to the people who were worse off. In such cases, 
equality and priority could not deeply conflict. Egalitarians overlooked 
the cases where equality could not be achieved except by levelling down. 
I shall now mention certain recent statements of Egalitarian views. 
In the case of some views, though they are presented as being about 
equality, that fact is superficial. These views could be restated as views 
about priority, and they would then become more plausible. But 
other views are essentially about equality, and cannot be restated in 
this way. 
We can start by asking which kind of view Nagel holds. In his re-
view ofNozick's book, Nagel seemed to conflate equality and priority. 
He wrote: 
To defend equality as a good in itself, one would have to argue 
that improvements in the lot of people lower on the scale of well-
being took priority over greater improvements to those higher 
on the scale. 38 
In his article 'Equality', Nagel does argue this. And, after claiming that 
it is more urgent to benefit the child who is worse off, he writes: 
This urgency is not necessarily decisive. It may be outweil\hed 
by other considerations, for equality is not the only value.· 9 
This suggests that, to the question 'Why is it more urgent to benefit 
this child?', Nagel would answer, 'Because this would reduce the in-
equality between these two children'. But I doubt that this is really Nagel's 
view. Would it be just as urgent to benefit the handicapped child, 
even if he had no sibling who was better oft? I suspect that, on Nagel's 
view, it would. Nagel is thus one writer who sometimes uses the lan-
guage of equality, when he is really appealing to the Priority View.40 
Consider next a remark of Dworkin's: 
It is perhaps the final evil of a genuinely unequal distribution 
of resources that some people have reason for regret just in the 
fact that they have been cheated of the chances others have had 
to make something valuable of their lives:11 
Why does Dworkin write 'the chances others have had'? That suggests 
that there would be no evil if no one had such chances. That seems wrong. 
The real evil seems to be that these people were cheated of the chances 
that they could have had. The argument for an equal distribution is not 
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to give people equal chances to make something valuable of their lives. 
That could be achieved by levelling down. The argument is rather that, 
while an unequal distribution gives good chances only to some peo-
ple, the same resources, if shared out, would give them to cveryone.42 
We can now turn to the idea of distribution according to need. Sev-
eral writers argue that, when we arc moved by this idea, our aim is to 
achieve equality. Thus Raphael writes: 
If the man with greater needs is given more than the man with 
lesser needs, the intended result is that each of them should hm·e 
(or at least approach) the same level of satisfaction; the in-
equality of nature is corrcctcd:13 
Others make similar claims. Thus, when discussing the giving of extra 
resources to meet the needs of the ill, or handicapped, Norman writes, 
'the underlying idea is one of equality. The aim is that everybody 
should, as far as possible, have an equally worthwhile life. •H As before, 
if this is the aim, it could be as well achieved by levelling down. This 
cannot be what Norman means. He could avoid this implication by omit-
ting the word 'equally'. He could simply say, 'the aim is that everybody 
should, as far as possible, ha\·e a worthwhile life.' With this revision, 
Norman could no longer claim that equality is the underlying idea. But 
that, I believe, would strengthen his argument. Distribution accord-
ing to need is more naturally interpreted as a form of the Prior·ityView.45 
Some ideas, however, cannot be reinterpreted in this way. For ex-
ample, Cohen suggests that 'the right reading of egalitarianism' is 
that 'its purpose is to eliminate involuntary disadvantage' :16 He means 
by this comparative disadvantage: being worse oO'than others. That is 
an essentially relational idea. Only equality could eliminate such dis-
advantage. Cohen's view could not be re-expressed in the language of 
priority. Remember next the view that it is in itself bad, or unfair, that 
some people arc horn abler or healthier than others, or that through 
the differences in the natural distribution of resources, some people 
arc worse off than others. That view is essentially about inequality. There 
arc many other cases. For example, Akc writes: 
Justice in a society as a whole ought to be understood as a com-
plete equality of the ovcntlllevcl of benefits and burdens of each 
member of that society. 
The various maxims of distributive justice, Akc claims, can all be in-
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terpreted as having as their aim 'to restore a situation of complete equal-
ity to the greatest degree possible':l7 
It is sometimes claimed that, though Egalitarians may seem com-
mitted to the intrinsic value of equality, that is not really so, and that 
no Egalitarian would believe that there was any case for levelling 
down.48 But, while that is true of some Egalitarians, it is not true of all. 
For example, Ake writes: 
What about the case of someone who suddenly comes into 
good fortune, perhaps entirely by his or her own efforts? Should 
additional burdens ... be imposed on that person in order to 
restore equality and safeguard justice? ... Why wouldn't it be 
just to impose any kind of additional burden whatsoever on him 
in order to restore the eguality? The answer is that, strictly 
speaking, it would be ... 49 
Ake concedes that, on his view, it would be just to level down, by im-
posing burdens on this person. He merely believes that the claim of 
justice would here be overridden, just as the claims of efficiency, or 
happiness, can be overridden. Levelling down would be in one way good, 
or be something that we would have a moral reason to do. Similarly, 
Temkin writes: 
I, for one, believe that inequality is bad. But do I reaUy think that 
there is some respect in which a world where only some are blind 
is worse than one where all are? Yes. Does this mean I think it 
would be better if we blinded everybody? No. Equality is not all 
that matters. 50 
Several other writers make such claims. 51 
XII 
Since some writers are unmoved by the Levelling Down Objection, 
let us now reconsider what that objection claims. The objection appeals 
to cases where, if some inequality were removed, that would be worse 
for some people and better for no one. As I have said, these arc the cases 
which raise the deepest disagreement between our two kinds of view. 
On the Priority View, we do not object to inequality except when 
it is bad for people. We shall see nothing good in the removal of in-
equality, when this would benefit no one. Telic Egalitarians disagree. 
On their view, inequality is in itselfbad. This implies that inequality is 
bad whether or not it is bad for people. 
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My last claim assumes that inequality is not in itself bad for people. 
Is this assumption justified? If we are worse ofT than other people, is 
that in iLo;elf bad for us? 
Inequality may, of course, have bad effects. For example, if I am 
worse ofT than other people, this may put me in their power, or make 
me envious, or undermine my self-respect. But such eiTecLo; are irrele-
vant here. We are concerned with the mere fact that I am worse ofT 
than other people. To isolate this fact, we can suppose that I am not 
aware of these people, and that their existence hao; no other effect on 
me. In such a case, though the inequality has no effects, it remains true 
that I am worse off than these other people. Is that bad for me? 
This question is easily misunderstood. It is, of course, in one sense 
bad for me that I am worse ofl' than these people. It would be better 
for me if I was not worse-ofT than them, because I was as well-off as tile)' 
actually are. If that were true, I would be better ofT. But this is not the 
relevant comparison. Clearly, it is bad for me that I am not that well 
ofT. But is it bad for me that they are? 
It may help to rephrase our question. We should not ask, 'Is it bad 
for me that I am worse ofT than other people?' This suggests that the 
relevant alternative is my being better ofT. Rather we should ask, 'Is it 
bad for me that, unknown to me, there are other people who are bet-
ter ofT than me? Would it be better for me if there were no such peo-
ple? Would it be better for me if these people had never existed, or 
were as badly ofT as me?' 
The answer depends on our view about what is in or against peo-
ple's interests, and there are several theories here. But I shall simply 
claim that, on all the plausible versions of these theories, the answer 
is No. The mere fact of inequality is not, in itself, bad for the people 
who arc worse ofT. Such inequalities may be naturally unfair. And it 
would of course be better for these people if they themselves were bet-
ter off. But it would not be better for them if, without any effects on 
them, the other people were just as badly off. 52 
We can now return to my earlier claim. For Telic Egalitarians, in-
equality is in iLo;clfbad. If that is so, it must he had even when it is not 
bad for people. For these Egalitarians, inequality is bad eum when it is 
bad for no one. 
That may seem enough reason to reject this view. We may think 
that nothing can be bad if it is bad for no one. But, before we assess 
this objection, we must distinguish two versions of this view. Consider 
these alternatives: 
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( l) Everyone at some level 
(2) Some at this level Others better off 
In outcome (1) everyone is equally well off. In outcome (2), some peo-
ple are better off. In (2) there is inequality, but this outcome is worse 
for no one. For Telic Egalitarians, the inequality in (2) is bad. Could 
this make (2), all things considered, a worse outcome than ( l)? 
Some Egalitarians answer Yes. These people do not believe that in-
equality would always make outcomes, all things considered, worse. On 
their view, the loss of equality could be morally outweighed by a suf-
ficient increase in the sum of benefits. But inequality is a great evil. It 
can make an outcome worse, even when this outcome would be bet-
ter for everyone. Those who hold this view I shall call Strong Egalitari-
ans. 
Others hold a different view. Since they believe that inequality is 
bad, they agree that outcome (2) is in one way worse. But they do not 
think it worse on balance, or all things considered. In a move from ( l) 
to (2), some people would become better off. For these Egalitarians, 
the loss of equality would be morally outweighed by the benefits to these 
people. On their view, (2) would be, on balance, better than ( l). 
Those who hold this view I shall call Moderates. 
This version of Egalitarianism is often overlooked, or dismissed. Peo-
ple typically produce the. standard objection to Strong Egalitarianism: 
the appeal to cases where a move to inequality would be bad for no 
. one. They then either ignore the Moderate view, or treat it as not worth 
considering. They assume that, if we claim that the badness of the in-
equality would always be outweighed by the extra benefits, our view 
must be trivial.53 
This, I believe, is a mistake. Our view would indeed be trivial if we 
held that any loss of equality, however great, could be outweighed by 
any gain in utility, however small. But that is not what Moderates claim. 
They claim only that, in this kind of case, those in which greater in-
equality would be worse for no one, the badness of the inequality 
would in fact be outweighed by the extra benefits. This claim can be 
subdivided into a pair of claims. One is a view about the relative im-
portance of equality and utility. The other, which has been overlooked, 
is a claim about the structure of these cases. If there is greater inequality, 
in a way that is worse for no one, the inequality must come from ben-
efits to certain people. And there cannot be a great loss of equality un-
less these benefit'> are also great. These gains and losses would roughly 
march in step. 
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In the simplest cases, this is obvious. Consider these alternatives: 
( 1 ) All at 100 
(2) Half at 100 
(3) Half at 100 
(4) Halfat 100 
Halfat 101 
Halfat 110 
Half at 200 
In a move from (l) to (2), there would be a small gain in utility but 
only a small loss in equality. In a move from (I) to (3) the loss in equal-
ity would be greater, but so would he the gain in utility. As we move 
lower down the list, both gains and losses would steadily grow. In more 
complicated cases, the point still holds. If one of two outcomes involves 
more inequality, but is worse for no one, the better-off must gain. 
There can be much more inequality only if the better-off gain a great 
deal. But there would then he much more mility.5·1 
Since these gains and losses roughly march in step, there is room 
for Moderates to hold a significant position. Moderates claim that, in 
all such cases, the gain in utility would outweigh the loss in equality. 
That is consistent \~ith the claim that, in other kinds of case, that may 
not be so. Moderates can claim that some gains in utility, even if grmt, 
would not outweigh some losses in equality. Consider, for example, these 
alternatives: 
(1) All at 100 
(4) Halfat 100 
(5) Half at 70 
Half at 200 
Half at 200. 
Moderates believe that, compared with (1), (4) is better. But they 
might claim that (5) is worse. This would not be a trivial claim. In a 
move from (l) to (5), the worse-off would lose, but the better-off 
would gain more than three times as much. Compared with (1), (5) 
would involve a great gain in utility. But, for these Moderates, this gain 
would be too small to outweigh the loss of equality. They would here 
choose a smaller sum of benefits, for the sake of a more equal distri-
bution. That is why, though Moderate, they arc true Egalitarians. 
Return now to the Levelling Down Objection. Strong Egalitarians 
believe that, in some cases, a move towards inequality, even though it 
would be worse for no-one, would make the outcome worse. This may 
seem incredible. \Ve may claim that one of two outcomes cannot be worse 
if it would be worse for no one. To challenge Strong Egalitarians, it 
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would be enough to defend this claim. 
To challenge Moderates, this claim may not be enough. Moderates 
believe that, if the outcome with greater inequality would be worse for 
no one, it would not be a worse outcome. But their claim is only that 
it would not be worse on balance, or all-things-considered. They must 
agree that, on their view, this outcome would be in one way worse. On 
their view, inequality is bad, even when it is bad for no one. To reject 
their view, we must claim that even this cannot be true. 
In the space remaining, I can make only a few remarks about this 
disagreement. It is widely assumed that, if an outcome is worse for no 
one, it cannot be in any way worse. This we can call the Person-affecting 
Claim. 
This claim might be defended by an appeal to some view about the 
nature of morality, or moral reasoning. Some, for example, argue as 
follows. It is not hard to see how an outcome can be worse for partic-
ular people. But it can seem puzzling how an outcome can be simply 
worse-worse, period. What is meant by this impersonal use of'worse'? 
Some suggest that this use of 'worse' can be explained, or constructed, 
out of the concept 'worse for'. There are other lines of thought which 
may lead to the Person-affecting Claim, such as a contractualist view 
about moral reasoning. 55 
Egalitarians might respond by defending a different meta-ethical 
view. Or they might argue that this claim has unacceptable implica-
tions, since it conflict'> too sharply with some of our beliefs. 
Temkin responds in the second way. The Person-affecting Claim, 
he argues, is incompatible with many of our ideals. 56 
Temkin's best example seems to me his appeal to what he calls 'pro-
portional justice'. Would it not be bad, he ao;ks, if'the evilest mass mur-
derers fare better than the most benign saints?' But this might not be 
bad for any of these people. 
It may be bad that the saints fare worse than the murderers. But 
this comparative element is too close to the question at issue: whether 
inequality is bad. So we should forget the saints. Is it bad that the mur-
derers fare as well as they do? Would it be better if they fared worse? 
We might think this better if it would give the murderers the pun-
ishment that they deserve. Note that, in thinking this, we arc not 
merely claiming that they ought to be punished. We may think that, 
if they arc not punished, perhaps because they cannot be caught, this 
would be bad. The badness here may not involve any further wrong-
doing. And we may think this bad even if their punishment would do 
no one any good-perhaps because, as in Kant's example, our com-
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munity is about to dissolve. 
If we accept this retributive view, we must n;ject the Person-affect-
ing Claim. We believe that, if people arc not punished as they deserve, 
this would be bad, even if it would be bad for no one. And, if that is 
true, the same could be true of the badness of inequality. 
Even if we reject the retributive view, as I do, this analogy may still 
be useful. Consider the claim that it would have been better if Hitler, 
unknown to others, had suffered for what he did. If we reject this claim, 
what would our reason be? Would it be enough to say, 'How could this 
have been better? It would not have been better for him.' This remark 
may seem to us inadequate. We may reject retribution, not because it 
is good for no one, but because we do not believe in the kind of free 
will that it seems to require. Perhaps we believe that, to deserve to suf:. 
fer for what we do, we would have to be responsible for our own char-
acters, in a way that seems to us to make no sense. 
If that is why we reject retribution, this analogy may still, in a some-
what curious way, tell against the Person-affecting Claim. We believe 
that, in one sense, retribution could have been good, even when it is 
good for no one. Or rather, what makes this impossible is not the truth 
of the Person-affecting Claim, but the incoherence of the required kind 
of free will. We might imagine coming to believe that this kind of free-
dom is not incoherent. We may agree that, in that case, we could not 
reject retribution merely by claiming that it is good for no one. If that 
objection would not be sufficient, why should it be sufficient as an ob-
jection to Egalitarianism? 
Fully to assess the Person-affecting Claim, we would need to discuss 
meta-ethics, or the nature of morality and moral reasoning. Since I can-
not do that here, I shall merely express an opinion.57 The Person-
affecting Claim has, I think, less force than, and cannot be used to 
strengthen, the Levelling Down Objection. 
Xlll 
I shall now summarise what I have claimed. 
I began by discussing the view that it is in itself had, or unfair, if 
some people are worse off than others through no fault or choice of 
theirs. This, the Telic Egalitarian view, can seem very plausible. But it 
faces the Levelling Down Objection. This objection seems to me to have 
great force, hut is not, I think, decisive. 
Suppose we began by being Telic Egalitarians, but are convinced 
by this objection. Suppose that we cannot believe that, if inequality were 
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removed in a way that is bad for some people, and better for no one, 
that change would be in any way good. If we arc to salvage something 
of our view, we then have two alternatives. 
We might become Deontic Egalitarians. We might believe that, 
though we should sometimes aim for equality, that is not because we 
would thereby make the outcome better. We must then explain our 
view in some other way. And the resulting view may have a narrower 
scope. For example, it may apply only to goods of certain kinds, such 
as those that are co-operatively produced, and it may apply only to in-
equality between certain people, such as members of the same com-
munity. 
We may also have to abandon some of our beliefs. Reconsider the 
Divided World: 
(1) Halfat 100 
(2) Half at 140 
Halfat200 
Halfatl40 
On the Deontic View, we cannot claim that it would be better if the 
situation changed from (1) to (2). Our view is only about what peo-
ple ought to do, and makes no comparisons between states of affairs. 
Our alternative is to move to the Priority View. We could then 
keep our view about the Divided World. It is true that, in a change from 
(1) to (2), the better off would lose more than the worse offwouldgain. 
That is why, in utilitarian terms, (2) is worse than ( 1). But, on the Pri-
ority View, though the better off would lose more, the gain to the worse 
off counts for more. Benefits to the worse off do more to make the out-
come better. We could claim that this is why ( 1) is worse than (2). 
The Priority View often coincides with the belief in equality. But, 
as I have suggested, they are quite different kinds of view. They can be 
attacked or defended in different ways. The same is true ofTelic and 
Deontic views. So, in trying to decide what we believe, the first step is 
to draw these distinctions. Taxonomy is unexciting, but it needs to be 
done. 
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APPENDIX: RAWLS'S VIEW 
How do the distinctions I have drawn apply to Rawls's theory? 
Rawls's Difference Principle seems to be an extreme version of the 
Priority View: one which gives absolute priority to benefiting those who 
are worse off. There are, however, three qualifications. We should 
apply the Difference Principle (I) only to the basic structure of soci-
ety, (2) only in conjunction with Rawls's other principles, which require 
equal liberty and equality of opportunity, and (3) we do not apply this 
principle to individuals, but only to the representative member of the 
worst-off group. 
Instead of claiming that the worst-off group should be as well off 
as possible, Rawls states his view in a less direct way. He makes claims 
about when inequality is unjust. On his view, whether some pattern of 
inequality is unjust depends on its effects upon the worst-off group. 
What these effects are depends on what alternatives were possible. Let 
us say that inequality hanns the worst-off group when it is true that, with-
out this inequality, this group could have been better off. Inequality 
benefits this group when it is true that, in every possible alternative with-
out this inequality, they would have been even worse off. 
Rawls often claims 
(A) Inequality is not unjust if it benefits the worst-off group. 
Egalitarians might accept this claim. They might say, 'Even in such cases, 
inequality is bad. But it is not unjust. Such inequality is, all things con-
sidered, justified by the fact that it benefits the worst off.' They might 
add that this inequality is, in a way, naturally unfair. It would then be 
a case of what Barry calls justified unfairness. 
Rawls's arguments do not suggest that such inequality is, in itself, 
bad. He seems to accept claim (A) in the spirit of the Priority View. 
On his Difference Principle, since we should give absolute priority to 
the worst-off group, if inequality benefits this group, it is straightfor-
wardly morally required. There is no moral balancing to be done-no 
intrinsic badness needing to be outweighed. 
Rawls just as often claims 
(B) Inequality is unjust if it harms the worst-off group. 
Egalitarians might make this claim. But, here again, it could be fully 
explained on the absolute version of the Priority View. On this view, 
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if the worst-off group could have been made better off, this is what should 
have been done. What is unjust is that the required priority has not 
been given to these people. 
I have suggested that Rawls's view could be regarded as one ver-
sion of the Priority View. What would show that it camwt be so regarded? 
That might be shown by Rawls's answer to a further question. On 
his view, inequality is not unjust if it benefits the worst-off group, and 
it is unjust if it harms this group. What if inequality neither benefits 
nor harms this group? Would it then be unjust? 
Suppose that, in some case, the only possible alternatives are these: 
( 1) Everyone at some level 
(2) Some at this level Others better off 
If we choose (2), there would be inequality, and this would not ben~ 
fit those who are worst-off. But there is no way in which the gains to 
the better off could be shared by both groups. The benefits to the bet-
ter off are, for some reason, not transferable. Since that is so, though 
the inequality in (2) would not benefit the worst-off group, it would 
not be worse for them. 
In such cases, on the Priority View, we must favour (2). The ben~ 
fits to the better off are unequivocally good. The fact that they increase 
inequality is, for us, of no concern. But, if we arc Egalitarians, we 
might oppose (2). We might claim that the inequality in (2) is bad, or 
unjust. 
Would Rawls agree? If he would, this would show that he does not 
hold a version of the Priority View. 
It is clear that, on Rawls's view, inequality is not unjust ifit bene-
fits the worst-off group. Does he mean 'if and only if? Is inequality un-
just if it does not benefit this group? 
The answer may seem to be Yes. Rawls's Second Principle merely 
reads 'Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they 
are ... to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged'. This is com-
patible with either answer. But his General Conception reads, 'All so-
cial primary goods ... arc to be distributed equally unless an unequal 
distribution ... is to the advantage of the least favored'. Similarly, Rawls 
writes, 'Injustice, then, is simply inequalities that are not to the bene-
fit of all.' And he often makes such claims. 58 This suggest that he ac-
cepts 
(C) Inequality is unjust, unless it benefits the worst-off group. 
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But Rawls may not intend (C). When he makes these claims, he may 
be assuming that the levels of the different groups are what he calls 
c/os~knit. This is true when any change in the level of one group would 
change the levels of the other groups. 59 When levels are close-knit, if 
inequality docs not benefit the worst-ofT group, it must hann that group. 
In such cases, (C) coincides with 
(D) Inequality is unjust only if it harms the worst-ofT group. 
In the passages to which I have referred, this may be all that Rawls means. 
In one section of his book, Rawls directly addresses my question. 
He considers a case in which the alternatives arc these: 
(1) Two people arc both at some level 
(2) One is at this level The other is better ofT 
On Rawls's Difference Principle, which of these outcomes should we 
choose? 
Rawls gives three answers. The Difference Principle, he writes, 'is 
a strongly egalitarian conception in the sense that unless there is a dis-
tribution that makes both persons better ofT ... an equal distribution 
is to be preferred'. (76) On this first answer, outcome (2) is worse than 
outcome (1). This remark doe.fcommitRawls to a version of claim (C). 
It tells us to avoid inequality unless it benefits those who arc worst-ofT. 
Rawls's second answer is implied by the indifference map with 
which he illustrates this casc:1i0 
This shows (2) to be as good as (1). On this map, (1) would be some 
point on the 45 degree diagonal, and (2) would be on the horizontal 
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line passing through this point. Since this is an indifference map, all points 
on this line are equally good. As Rawls writes, 'No matter how much 
either person's situation is improved, there is no gain from the stand-
point of the difference principle unless the other gains also'. No gain 
from the standpoint of this principle; but also, as the indifference 
map implies, no loss. later in this section, however, Rawls writes, 'the 
difference principle is compatible with the principle of efficiency'. (79) 
This implies that (2) is betterthan (1). Compared with (1), (2) is bet-
ter for someone, and worse for no one. 
Given the further assumptions that Rawls makes, and the use to 
which he puts his principles, this inconsistency is not in practice 
damaging. But, for the purposes of theory, it is worth asking which 
of these three answers is Rawls's true view. If he accepts the first or 
second answer, he cannot hold a version of the Priority View. And 
this would affect the arguments that could be given for or against his 
view. 
I believe that the third answer, though less often supported in his 
text, is Rawls's true view. He would accept, not (C), but (D). On his 
view, inequality is unjust only if it worsens the position of those who 
are worse off. That is what is implied by the Lexical version of his Dif-
ference Principle. On that principle, if we cannot make other groups 
better off, we should, if we can, make the best-off group even better off. 
We should, that is, increase inequality, in a way that does not benefit 
any of the people who are worse off. 
More important, this is the view to which we are led by Rawls's main 
arguments. From the standpoint of the Original Position, we would 
clearly favour giving benefits to the better off, when this would not worsen 
the position of those who are worse off. For all we know, we might be 
the people who are better off. On Rawls's assumptions, we would not 
limit the gains to ourselves if we were in this position for the sake of 
limiting other people's gains if we were not. Describing the motivation 
of his parties, Rawls writes: 'Nor do they try to gain relative to one an-
other ... They strive for as high an absolute score as possible. They 
do not wish a high or a low score for their opponents, nor do they seek 
to maximize or minimize the difference between their successes and 
those of others.' ( 144) 
As these last remarks suggest, Rawls's view is not merely compati-
ble with the Priority View. Given his main argument, it must be, in its 
content, a version of this view, since it must be concerned with absolute 
not relative levels. On the Difference Principle, we should make the 
worst-off group as well off as possible. It is quite irrelevant whether, in 
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so doing, we reduce or increase inequality. This means that, on my de-
finition, Rawls is at most a Non-Relational Egalitarian. 
Rawls's view is not, however, merely a version of the Priority View. 
If it were, it would be implausibly extreme. If we are not egalitarians, 
and are not concerned with whether some people arc worse off tlum 
others, it is hard to see why we should give absolute priority to benefit-
ing people who arc worse off. And that view seems too extreme even 
when, as in Rawls's case, it applies only to the basic structure of soci-
ety, and only to the representative member of the worst-off group. If 
we arc not concerned with relative levels, why should the smallest ben-
efit to the representative worst-off person count for infinitely more than 
much greater benefits to other representative people? 
To explain this feature of Rawls's view, we should, I believe, rein-
troduce the moral importance of equality. An objection to natural in-
equality is, I have suggested, one of the foundations of Rawls's theory. 
And Rawls himself claims that, in an account ofjusticc, equal division 
is the natural first step, and provides the benchmark by reference to 
which we can defend our final principles. 
As Barry notes, this suggests a different way to defend Rawls's Dif-
ference Principlc.61 First we argue for equality, by appealing to the ar-
bitrariness of the natural lottery. Then we allow departures from 
equality provided that these arc not worse for those who arc worst-off. 
This explains why, in Rawls's phrase, the worst-off have the veto, so that 
benefits to them should have absolute priority. 
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